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THE DENIAL OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY TO POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATES:
AN UNJUSTIFIED STRAIN
ON FEDERALISM*
I. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE AS INDEPENDENT
ENTITIES UNDER THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: AN
EXCEPTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
Throughout the history of the United States the Supreme Court
has maintained that cities, counties, and other such political subdivi-
sions are constitutionally indistinguishable from the state that created
them. A major exception to this rule arises under the eleventh amend-
ment, however, for the courts have consistently held that while states
themselves are immune from suit in federal court, their subdivisions
may not share in this immunity. This Comment will examine the im-
pact of this exception on the balance of powers between union and state
and seek an explanation that justifies the strain the exception places on
the principles of federalism.
A. The General Rule: Political Subdivisions are Indistinguishable
from the State that Creates Them.
Very early in the nation's history the Supreme Court firmly ex-
pressed the view that cities, counties, and other political subdivisions
were indistinguishable parts of the states that created them. The cases
dealing with the question described state political subdivisions as "con-
venient agencies"' for exercising government powers, "mere creatures
of the legislative will,"2 "parts of the machinery,"3 "instrumentalities,"4
* The author wishes to thank Professor William W. Van Alstyne for his invaluable advice
on the issues raised in this Comment.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972) [hereinafter
cited as C. JACOBS];
Baker, Federalism andihe Eleventh 4mendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Baker].
1. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see City of Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1923).
2. Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307,
312 (1875); see City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 187.
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"departments," 5 and "auxiliaries" 6 of the state. They stressed the states'
unbridled power to create, control, and demolish their subdivisions 7
and to control the governmental property over which the subdivisions
exercised domain.8 The Court's discussion of the status of a city in
Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway9 states this princi-
ple:
[A] municipal corporation is not only a part of the State but is a
portion of its governmental power. "It is one of its creatures, made
for a specific purpose, to exercise within a limited sphere the powers
of the State. The State may withdraw these local powers of govern-
ment at its pleasure, and may, through its legislature or other ap-
pointed channels, govern the local territory as it governs the State at
large. It may enlarge or contract its powers or destroy its exist-
ence."10
The many cases Worcester represents reiterate two themes: first,
the acts of political subdivisions are the acts of the state; second, in
acting through its political subdivisions, a state merely exercises indi-
3. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry., 196 U.S. 539, 549 (1905); Commissioners
of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. at 310.
4. Louisiana v. Folsum, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883); see Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 667, 676 (1872); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
517, 638 (1819).
5. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 187; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S.
540, 544 (1875).
6. Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. at 311.
7. In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), the Court stated:
The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these [political subdivi-
sions] and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion
of the State. . . . The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such
powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other
agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be
done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or
even against their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative
body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by
any provision of the Constitution of the United States.
Id at 178-79 (1907); see City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 187; Missouri v. Lewis, 101
U.S. 22, 30 (1879); Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 passim (1879); Commissioners of
Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. at 313.
8. See Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 530 (1899) (the state may direct that a
municipal corporation collect a particular tax and appropriate the proceeds to some special pur-
pose, or it may direct that the corporation assume and pay a particular claim); Board of Comm'rs
v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 114 (1876) (since municipal property is derived from the state or obtained
by means that only the state can authorize, it is completely subject to legislative control and can be
applied to whatever purpose the state deems appropriate); Commissioners of Laramie County v.
Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. at 313 (state may order new roads to be built at the
expense of the county).
9. 196 U.S. 539 (1904).
10. Id at 549 (quoting United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 329 (1872)).
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rectly the same power that it might exercise directly."I
Modem constitutional law continues to recognize that the delega-
tion of power by a state does not create a distinct sovereign entity.'2
This is clearly illustrated by the fact that clauses of the Constitution
that limit the states, such as the double jeopardy clause,'3 the equal
protection clause,14 the due process clause,' 5 and the contracts clause,' 6
also limit their political subdivisions.
In Waller v. Florida,'7 for example, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant convicted in municipal court for violation of a city ordi-
nance could not be convicted on a state charge for the same act, as the
second trial would constitute double jeopardy under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. In answer to the State's argument that cities are
autonomous entities set apart from the state much as the states are set
apart from the federal government, the Court replied: "Political subdi-
visions of States--counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never
have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been tra-
ditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities cre-
ated by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions."t"
In Waller the Court recognized the existence of only two sovereign
entities within the United States-the federal and the state govern-
ments. Moreover, the opinion made it clear that although the state may
delegate its sovereignty, it cannot multiply it.
Reapportionment cases, such as Avery v. Midland County,'9 rein-
force the view expressed by the Court in Waller. In Avery, the Court
found that although the Texas state legislature was itself properly ap-
portioned, the act of a county commission in improperly apportioning
itself constituted state action subject to the restraints of the equal pro-
tection clause. In support of its decision the Court explained that "[tjhe
Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state power however
11. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 186; Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S.
at 529-30; Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667, 676 (1872).
12. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "IN]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ......
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall ... deny to any person. . . the equal
protection of the laws."
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...."
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1: "No state shall. . . pass any . . .Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. .. ."
17. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
18. Id at 392 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)).
19. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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manifested, whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of the
State .... The actions of the local government are the actions of the
State." 20
A further illustration is the fact that the Court has generally held
that local ordinances are equivalent to state laws. Thus the actions of
local officials taken under color of city or county ordinances are actions
of the state, limited by the contracts clause,2' the equal protection
clause,22 and the due process clause.23 Further, political subdivisions
are subject to the limitations imposed on states by the fourteenth
amendment's incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.24
B. The Rationale for the General Rule.- The Power to Delegate as an
Important Element of the State's Sovereignty.
The Supreme Court has characterized the power to delegate au-
thority as an essential component of each state's sovereignty, for the
tenth amendment 25 protects the states' right to define and organize
their own governmental functions in a manner that suits their particu-
lar needs and convenience. "[I]t would seriously interfere with the
power of a State . . .to deny to it this right [to delegate]. 26
20. Id at 479-80; see Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
21. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See, e.g., Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. v. City of Co-
lumbus, 203 U.S. 311, 320 (1906) ("That the ordinance of the common counsel of a municipal
corporation may constitute a law within the meaning of this constitutional clause is too well set-
tled to admit of doubt").
22. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (acknowledging the state's interest
in delegating authority as well as the people's interest in retaining certain powers on a local level,
but finding that the state is nonetheless responsible for local governmental activities that violate
the equal protection clause); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state
action found when the parking authority, created by the city, leased space in a building it owned
to a private restaurant that discriminated against blacks); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1958) (actions of local school officials in school segregation case found to be actions of the state in
violation of the equal protection clause); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353
U.S. 230 (1957) (state action found in discriminatory actions of city board of directors, despite
state disapproval of the activities, as indicated by the fact that the state joined in the suit against
the board); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (any municipal ordinance adopted
under state authority constitutes state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment).
23. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (local charges based on city
loitering and disorderly conduct ordinances so devoid of evidentiary support as to violate the due
process clause).
24. See, e.g., See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (city ordinance violated the fourth amend-
ment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949) (city ordinance violated first amendment as applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
26. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879); see Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 416, 428 (1853) (Taney, Ci., pblrality opinion):
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigtuez,27 an
equal protection case, the Court emphasized the importance of the
states' self-structuring and delegating power and their need to exercise
this power free of federal interference. In Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court refused to overturn the Texas system of allocating state support
to schools in proportion to the amount of local taxes each district could
raise, though the system had a differential impact on poor and wealthy
districts. Relying on the principles of federalism, the Court character-
ized the suit as
nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has cho-
sen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked
to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivi-
sions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local
interests. In doing so, appellees would have the Court intrude in an
area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.2"
Reiterating the importance of traditional state structural auton-
omy, the Court carried its Rodriguez rationale even further in National
League of Cities v. Usery.29 In that case the Court invoked the tenth
amendment to invalidate the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act,30 which extended minimum wage and maximum hour pro-
visions to employees of states and their political subdivisions. The
Court reasoned that the amendments would impose substantial costs
upon states and their political subdivisions, and that this imposition
threatened to disrupt the states' chosen methods of structuring and de-
livering traditional governmental services.3' This federal interference
with the states' integral functions was impermissible because it might
lead to the destruction of the "the States' 'separate and independent
existence.' "32
These cases, like those discussed in the preceding section, suggest
that a state's governmental power is ultimately unitary. They further
suggest that the state's decision to create political subdivisions and
[WJith the exception of the powers surrendered by the Constitution of the United States,
the people of the several States are absolutely and unconditionally sovereign within their
respective territories .... The principle that they are the best judges of what is for their
own interest, is the foundation of our political institutions.
Id at 428.
27. 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
28. Id at 40 (footnotes omitted).
29. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55.
31. 426 U.S. at 847-48. According to the Court, the "political subdivisions" that Congress
desired to subject to its requirements derive their authority and power from the states that created
them. Interference with the integral governmental services provided by these "subordinate arms
of state government," therefore, is beyond congressional power, "just as if such services were
provided by the state itself." Id at 855 n.20.
32. Id at 851.
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delegate its power to them is itself a vital part of the state's sovereignty.
Federal interference with a subdivision performing a delegated act is
therefore equivalent to federal interference with the state itself. In ef-
fect, as a general rule, a state neither gains nor loses by its decision to
delegate or not to delegate. It cannot, by delegating authority, circum-
vent the Constitution's controls on states.3 Likewise, a state normally
loses none of its powers or discretion by delegating, since it retains
complete control over its subdivisions, free of federal interference. 34
C. The Exception: Political Subdivisions as Independent Entities for
Eleventh Amendment Purposes.
Despite its consistent holdings under other sections of the Consti-
tution that the state and its political subdivisions form a single unit, the
Supreme Court has long held that under the eleventh amendment,35
the states and their political subdivisions are separate entities.36 Thus,
while suits against a state may not be brought in federal court without
the state's consent, no consent is necessary for suits against counties,
municipalities, and other such "independent ' 37 political subdivisions.
The notion that political subdivisions are independent entities is
33. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 25-26 & 31 supra and text accompanying notes 25-32 supra. As the Court
stated in Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307
(1875): "It is settled law, that the legislature, in granting [governmental power to a municipality or
county], does not divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possessed
before the charter was granted." Id at 308. These subdivisions have no inherent right of self-
government that places them beyond the legislative control of the state. City of Trenton v. New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186 (1923). The arrangements made between the state and its political subdi-
visions are not considered contracts and are, accordingly, not subject to the contracts clause of the
Constitution, Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 558-59 (1879), nor does the contracts clause
or the due process clause inhibit the state from withdrawing or otherwise disposing of property
held by the subdivision for governmental purposes, City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at
188. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-81 (1907).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
36. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
There are two other notable exceptions to the rule: subdivisions are not part of the state for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1976), which grants federal jurisdiction in "[a]ll controversies
between two or more states," Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 684 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1971), nor are they in all cases a part of the state for
purposes of the state action exemption from the antitrust laws, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 414-15 (1978).
37. Cities and counties are always considered independent from the state for eleventh
amendment purposes. A large body of case law exists concerning which political subdivisions
other than cities and counties are independent-and therefore unprotected-and which subdivi-
sions are simply alter egos of the state. See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons v. New Jersey Turnpike
Auth. 268 F. Supp. 568, 574 (D.N.J. 1967). See text accompanying notes 50-54 infra.
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puzzling for reasons other than the inconsistency with the holdings
under other portions of the Constitution. This notion is also in appar-
ent conflict with constitutional doctrines expressed in the tenth and
eleventh amendments. The Court has recognized that a purpose of the
eleventh amendment is to protect the internal administration of the
sovereign state from federal encroachment38 Nonetheless, in differen-
tiating between states and political subdivisions in eleventh amend-
ment cases, the Court ignores this purpose. If a state decides to keep a
particular fiscal or regulatory authority within the governmental frame-
work of "the state" itself, it may use that authority without fear of suit
in federal court. But if it chooses to delegate the authority to an incor-
porated political subdivision, both the subdivision and, practically
speaking, the state, will be subject to unconsented-to suits for money
damages in federal courts. Thus, the state's protection against suits in
federal court depends almost entirely on whether or not it decides to
delegate. 39 Differentiation of states from their political subdivisions
under the eleventh amendment appears directly to undercut the Court's
policy of honoring the state's prerogative to structure and deliver tradi-
tionally local governmental services in the manner it chooses.40
In effect, "state," as a word or concept, has been given different
meanings under separate parts of the Constitution. While different
meanings should not alone be remarkable,4' it is appropriate to seek a
38. See notes 110-16 infra and accompanying text.
39. "Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is an attribute of the State only in its corpo-
rate sovereign capacity; if our complex society necessitates delegation of certain tasks to independ-
ent agents for the State, the rationale of the amendment does not dictate its extension to them as
well." S.J. Groves & Sons v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 579 (D.N.J. 1967).
See Note, State Governmental Corporation Immunityfrom Federal Jurisdiction Under the Eleventh
Amendment, 72 DICK. L. REv. 296, 298-99 (1968).
Likewise, even when "the state" itself undertakes a purely proprietary, as opposed to govern-
mental, function, it may be immune from suit, see, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S.
151 (1909). Its subdivisions performing strictly governmental functions directed by the state, how-
ever, will not be granted immunity. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) ("mhe Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh]
Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even
though such entities exercise a 'slice of state power' ").
40. See notes 26 & 31 supra and text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
41. For instance, the term "citizen" is held to include private corporations for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction under article III, Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497,555
(1844), but not under the privileges and immunities clauses of the fourteenth amendment, Selover,
Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912), or article IV, Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566, 573 (1870). Likewise, the term "person" may include private corporations
for purposes of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36
(1925), but not for purposes of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, Curcio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957).
Vol. 1979:1042] ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
rational explanation for the variance. If the difference in interpretation
serves some purpose, that purpose should then be weighed against the
infringement on state sovereignty caused by its promotion.42
II. A SEARCH FOR THE REASONS BEHIND THE EXCEPTION
A. Explanation by the Courts.
1. The Court's Explanation Upon Establishing the Exception. Po-
litical subdivisions were sued regularly in federal courts without objec-
tion at the time of Chisholm v. Georgia,43 the 1793 case in which the
Supreme Court took federal jurisdiction over a state in a private suit
for damages, thus sparking the controversy leading to passage of the
eleventh amendment.' Ratification of the eleventh amendment did
not abate these suits against political subdivisions.
The Supreme Court first squarely faced the issue of subdivision
immunity in Lincoln County v. Luning,45 a century after passage of the
eleventh amendment. In Lincoln, the defendant county attempted to
claim the sovereign immunity of the state under the eleventh amend-
ment as a bar to jurisdiction. The Court unanimously rejected the con-
tention, stating:
[I]t may be observed that the records of this court for the last thirty
years are full of suits against counties, and it would seem as though
by general consent the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in such suits
had become established. But irrespective of this general acquies-
cence, the jurisdiction of the Circuit courts is beyond question. The
Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits against a
State. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in Osborn v. The Bank of
the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 857, that "the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution
over suits against States, is of necessity limited to those suits in which
the State is a party on the record."
While that statement was held by this court in the case of In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, to be too narrow, yet by that decision the juris-
diction was limited only in respect to those cases in which the State is
a real, if not a nominal defendant; and while the county is territori-
ally a part of the State, yet politically it is also a corporation created
by and with such powers as are given to it by the State. In this re-
spect it is a part of the State only in that remote sense in which any
city, town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of
42. This Comment does not purport to evaluate the usefulness or philosophical consistency
of the eleventh amendment as a whole.
43. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
44. In Chisholm, Chief Justice Jay, in deciding that the states were subject to suit in federal
court, noted that a private citizen could sue a municipality and that there was no rational basis for
granting the citizens of a state immunity when the citizens of a municipality had none. Id at 472.
45. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
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the State.46
This discussion, apart from vague references to the fact of incorpo-
ration, offers no reasoning in support of the finding that subdivisions
are entities apart from the state for purposes of jurisdiction. Instead,
past practices alone served as the basis for the Lincoln Coim y result.4 7
Lincoln County is now routinely cited as the authority for denying
political subdivisions eleventh amendment protection. Rather than
questioning or explaining the basis for the Lincoln County rule,4" recent
cases focus on whether a particular governmental entity is sufficiently
independent of the state (or sufficiently similar to a county or city) to
justify the loss of immunity.49
Since the courts have failed to offer any explicit explanation for
the Lincoln County rule, an explanation must be sought from some
other source. One possible source is the eleventh amendment case law
developed by courts in deciding whether particular governmental enti-
ties are a part of the state or, like cities and counties, independent sub-
divisions subject to suit in the federal courts. Factors used in making
this differentiation may provide a clue to the purpose for which the
distinction is made. A second source is the theoretical foundations of
the eleventh amendment and an examination of whether the amend-
ment's purposes are promoted by excluding subdivisions from cover-
age.
2. Indirect Explanation Through Courts'Application of the Excep-
tion. At the time of Lincoln County the structure and services of state
government were relatively simple. The complex, highly specialized
46. Id at 530.
47. See Camden Interstate Ry. v. Catlettsburg, 129 F. 421, 423 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1904):
[T]he amendment in question does not deny jurisdiction to the federal courts of the suit,
for it denies to them jurisdiction only of suits against "one of the United States," and not
against a subdivision thereof. If the federal courts do not, by reason ofsaid amendment,
have jurisdiction of suits against municipal corporations, it is hard to understand upon
what ground it has been that they have so often taken jurisdiction of suits against them.
Id at 423.
48. Courts holding that the acts of political subdivisions are "state actions" restricted by the
fourteenth amendment but that the subdivisions are not "state defendants" within the meaning of
the eleventh amendment often acknowledge the inconsistency in the two definitions of "state."
Nevertheless, the courts offer no rationale for the difference. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 667 n. 12 (1974); Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1205 (4th Cir. 1975); Adams v.
Richland School Dist. One, 412 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.S.C. 1976). See also Mathis, The Eleventh
Amendment Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207, 242 (1968).
To add to the general confusion, while the subdivision itself may be subject to suit in federal
court even though it performs state governmental functions, an official of the subdivision who is
named as an individual defendant in the same action may claim immunity from suit under the
principles governing suits against state officers. See C. JACOBS 188 n. 11 (1972).
49. See text accompanying notes 50-54 infra.
1050 [Vol. 1979:1042
Vol. 1979:10421 ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMM UNITY
political subdivisions we know today were few. As a result, when con-
sidering eleventh amendment protection for political subdivisions, the
Court focused its attention primarily on cities and counties. The rule
was straightforward: immunity for the state, no immunity for cities
and counties. However, as time passed and state governments grew,
they undertook increasingly complex duties and created scores of less
easily categorized political entities to perform them. Numerous cases
arose to determine whether such entities as toll bridge authorities,5'
highway commissions, 51 liquor control boards, 52 and state schools5 3 are
"more like a county or city" or more like an "arm of the State. '54
These cases suggest a variety of factors that courts will consider in de-
ciding whether a given governmental entity will enjoy eleventh amend-
ment immunity.
(a) Incorporation and other traditional indicia of autonomy. One
important consideration that the courts have relied upon since the ear-
liest cases is whether or not the entity in question has its own corporate
indentity 5 Because incorporation generally implies the existence of a
separate, self-determining entity, the fact that the state incorporated the
entity arguably indicates that it intended to create a body separate from
itself. Of particular importance is the corporation's power to sue and
be sued in its own name. 6
The older cases sometimes referred to cities and counties simply as
"corporations" and subjected them to general provisions of state corpo-
rate law.57 Another line of early cases stressed that the state could not
confer its eleventh amendment immunity on a proprietary business cor-
poration simply by allowing incorporation or by participating in the
business corporation as a stockholder. In fact, the state itself would be
stripped of its immunity when participating actively in the business
transactions of such corporations. 58 This case law could have been the
50. See, e.g., Fowler v. California Toll-Bridge Auth., 128 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1942).
51. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194 (1929).
52. See, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1908).
53. See, e.g., Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718 (D. Del. 1974).
54. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719 (1973); Hutchison v. Lake Os-
wego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1976).
56. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. at 719; Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415
F.2d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1969); Roseman v. Hassler, 382 F. Supp.
1328, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1974), a f'd, 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975); Universal Sur. Co. v. Lescher &
Mahoney, Architects & Eng'rs, 340 F. Supp. 303, 304 (D. Ariz. 1972).
57. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
58. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Bank ofKy. v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318 (1829); Bank of United States
v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
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basis for the Court's finding that incorporated political subdivisions,
like private corporations, cannot share in the state's immunity even
though the state maintains an active interest in the entity's functions.
The rationale behind the Court's refusal to allow the state to con-
fer its immunity on proprietary business corporations, however, was
that a corporation is a different "person" from those who are its stock-
holders. 59 This principle should not apply to incorporated political
subdivisions since the state cannot be characterized as their stock-
holder. Further, a distinction can readily be made between a state's
participation in a private or semiprivate business operation and its par-
ticipation in a governmental function of the kind generally pursued by
incorporated political subdivisions.60
Several non-eleventh amendment cases decided shortly before Lin-
coln County serve further to undercut the theory that incorporation of a
political subdivision creates an entity so independent and distinct from
the state as logically to justify a denial of state immunity. The cases
demonstrate that incorporated political subdivisions cannot and should
not be equated with private corporations.
In United States v. Railroad Co.,6 the Supreme Court undertook
to describe the "nature and character" of municipal corporations and
their "connection with the government of the state":
[C]ities and towns. . . are allowed to assume to themselves some of
the duties of the State. . . . but having neither property nor power
for the purposes of personal aggrandizement, they can be considered
in no other light than as auxiliaries of the government, and as the
secondary deputies and trustees and servants of the people.
• . . [T]he main distinction between public and private corpora-
tions is, that over the former the legislature. . .has the exclusive and
unrestrained control; and . . . as it may create, so may it modify or
destroy, as public exigency requires or recommends .... It pos-
sesses the right to alter, abolish, or destroy all such institutions
62
59. Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. at 323-24; see Mathis, supra note 48, at 237.
60. The courts have often recognized the distinction between government participation in
proprietary and strictly governmental functions. Indeed, the proprietary or governmental aspects
of a particular political agency are often cited as factors to be considered when deciding whether
the agency is an independent subdivision or a part of the state for purposes of suit in federal court.
See, e.g., Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559, 569 (N.D. Ala. 1955). However, while this
consideration is often recited, the majority of cases in which state immunity from suit has been
denied have dealt with subdivisions engaged in governmental functions, rather than proprietary
functions. Further, when the court determines that it is the state itself that is directly performing a
proprietary function, immunity may be granted. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151
(1909).
61. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873).
62. Id at 328-29 (footnotes omitted).
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Again, in Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith,63 decided just one year prior to
Lincoln County, the Court held that while state legislatures generally
granted powers of a defined character to municipal corporations, this
grant of powers did not prevent the legislatures from retaining unlim-
ited control over the subdivisions' charters. 64 Thus while the Court ac-
cepted the theory that private corporations are individual, autonomous
entities possessing constitutional rights, it nevertheless was unwilling to
equate political corporations with private corporations in this respect.65
On the contrary, the state's absolute control of the political corporation
stemmed from the subdivision's role as a mere "instrumentality of the
state," irrespective of the subdivision's incorporated or unincorporated
status.66 The act of the state in incorporating the subdivision was not
interpreted as creating an autonomous entity with rights against the
state and the power to pursue interests of its own. Rather, the subdivi-
sion was incorporated only because incorporation was necessary to give
the subdivision the powers it needed to conduct the business that the
state desired it to pursue on its behalf.
The fact of incorporation, then, which has so often been men-
tioned by the courts in distinguishing the state proper from its in-
dependent subdivisions,67 makes no practical difference in the
relationship between the state and its subdivision and provides no basis
for distinguishing between the two for purposes of federal court juris-
diction. Other criteria for differentiation routinely cited by the courts
include the power to levy and collect taxes, 68 issue bonds, 69 borrow
money,70 enter into contracts,7 take property in the subdivision's own
name,72 and hire employees.73 These criteria are all variations on the
63. 100 U.S. 514 (1879).
64. Id at 529; see Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880).
65. It is also interesting to note that the fact of incorporation or any other implied similarity
between public and private corporations has not been a significant consideration for the Supreme
Court in holding that the acts of political subdivisions are the acts of the state for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. Private corporations, on the other hand, are entities apart from the state
despite the fact that they are incorporated and regulated by the state.
66. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638 (1819).
67. Though often mentioned, the fact of incorporation is not uniformly controlling in the
determination of an entity's status. See, e.g., Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ala.
1955), in which a school board, though incorporated like a city or county, was granted state immu-
nity against suit.
68. N.M. Paterson & Sons v. Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323, 324 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
69. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
70. N.M. Paterson & Sons v. Chicago, 176 F. Supp. at 324.
71. Morris v. Board of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188, 205 (D. Del. 1975).
72. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 179-80 (1st Cir.
1974).
73. N.M. Paterson & Sons v. Chicago, 176 F. Supp. at 324.
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incorporation criterion and rest on the same underlying proposition: if
a political subdivision has the outward trappings of independence it
will not receive state immunity from suit in federal court,74 even
though the apparent independence of the subdivision is illusory. The
independent powers test as applied by the courts may provide a handy,
manageable means for drawing a line, but the existence of such powers
does not provide a valid reason for making the differentiation in the
first instance.
(b) Financial impact of a judgment on the state treasury. In recent
years courts facing the question of subdivision immunity have dimin-
ished their emphasis on the subdivision's "independent" structure in
favor of criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in FordMotor Co. v.
Department of Treasury.75 In Ford Motor Co., the Court focused on
the ultimate source from which funds to pay the judgment would come,
holding that when the action is "in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest
and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit. ... 76 Re-
cently, some lower courts have gone so far as to make the potential
source of payment for a judgment the controlling factor, as in Adams v.
Richland School District One:77
[WI]here it appears that the money damages sought against the de-
fendant would not result in any additional expenditure of public
funds from the state treasury, the logical conclusion is that the pro-
tection of the eleventh amendment is unavailable notwithstanding
other factors which might indicate state control over the defendant.
That county funds would be used to satisfy any possible judgment is
of no significance under the eleventh amendment.78
Under this theory, an ancillary or indirect effect on the state treasury is
insufficient to trigger eleventh amendment protection.79 The presence
of significant amounts of direct state monetary aid to the defendant
also fails to create immunity as long as the plaintiff's success in the
action will not affect the amount of state funds flowing to the defend-
ant.80
74. See Whitehall, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity: Vagaries of a Federal
Fiction, 10 TuLSA L. REv. 436, 439 (1975).
75. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
76. Id at 464; see Edelman v.. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-71 (1974).
77. 412 F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1976).
78. Id at 649; see Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 966-67 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1976); Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment-
Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473, 1486 (1973).
79. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 668.
80. Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d at 966; Adams v. Richland
School Dist. One, 412 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.S.C. 1976).
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The interest in protecting state treasuries from federal interference
is widely acknowledged as a major purpose of the eleventh amend-
ment.8' Insofar as suits against political subdivisions with "independ-
ent" treasuries do indeed allow recovery without disturbing state
resources, there is a reasonable basis for differentiating between the po-
litical subdivisions and their states for eleventh amendment purposes.
The courts adopting this rationale, however, appear to assume that the
only money the state possesses is in a central state treasury, and that
any funds not in this treasury are not state funds, despite their use for
state governmental purposes. This approach is unrealistic. Funds in
the hands of a state-created, state-controlled government corporation
must surely also be state funds.82 Numerous early cases firmly estab-
lish that the state has full control over governmental property held by
its political subdivisions, and that it may direct the property's use or
recall it from the subdivision at will.83 In Meriwether v. Garrett,84 the
Supreme Court recognized that the property of state-created govern-
ment corporations was the property of the state: "Upon the dissolution
[of the corporation], the property passes under the immediate control of
the State, the agency of the corporation then ceasing." 85 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has held that the revenues of a municipal corpora-
tion are, like the revenues of the state, not subject to federal taxation,
since the taxation of municipalities would hinder the right of states to
"administer their own affairs through their legislative, executive, and
judicial departments, in their own manner through their own agencies
... ,,86 If funds of the municipality are in fact funds of the state for
tax purposes, it seems that they should be for other purposes as well.
It may be assumed that the state has granted its subdivision the
power to hold funds so that the subdivision may provide its citizens
with some service or benefit. Thus the state, through the political sub-
division, is only doing indirectly what it might otherwise do directly.87
81. See, e.g., Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975); Note, supra
note 78, at 1486. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
82. See Note, supra note 39, at 298-99.
83. See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-80 (1907); Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Guth-
ie, 173 U.S. 528, 529-30 (1899); Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 114 (1876); Commis-
sioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 313 (1875). See
notes 1-9 supra and accompanying text.
84. 102 U.S. 472 (1880).
85. Id at 513. In White v. Umatilla County, 247 F. Supp. 918, 919 (D. Ore. 1965), the court
noted that a county does not own funds in the county treasury in the same sense that a person or
corporation owns property or money. The county funds are public property subject to legislative
control.
86. United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 327 (1872).
87. Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667 (1872); see Guthrie Natl Bank v.
Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 529-30 (1899).
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When a federal court renders a judgment against such a political cor-
poration, the state may be just as effectively hindered in its ability to
provide the service as it would be if the judgment were rendered
against the state itself. A suit in federal court against a political subdi-
vision, then, may allow federal interference with state treasuries.88
Rather than providing a rational basis for the eleventh amendment dif-
ferentiation of states and their subdivisions, the state treasury approach
argues for granting the subdivisions the same immunity enjoyed by the
state.
(c) The laws ofthe state. Many courts, in deciding whether a par-
ticular political subdivision will be granted state immunity, have made
a point of asserting that the state law defining the subdivision will be
afforded great weight in the decisionmaking process.8 9 On its face, this
would appear to mitigate the federalism problems inherent in differen-
tiating the subdivisions from the state. It is apparent, however, that the
courts are not saying that the state may, through its laws, declare its
intent that a subdivision share its immunity in federal court. Rather,
the court will look to the manner in which the state has structured the
subdivision and then turn to federal case law to determine whether the
particular structure employed by the state will entitle the subdivision to
immunity.90 Therefore, though state law may declare that a subdivi-
88. On the federal level, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the funds of a federal
government corporation are the funds of the federal government. In Inland Waterways Corp. v.
Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1939), the Supreme Court faced the question of whether a national bank
could pledge assets to secure deposits of funds made by a government corporation in the same way
that it would pledge assets to secure deposits of the United States Treasury. The Court held that
[s]o far as the powers of a national bank to pledge its assets are concerned, the form
which Government takes-whether it appears as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec-
retary of War, or the Inland Waterways Corporation-is wholly immaterial. The mo-
tives which lead Government to clothe its activities in corporate form are entirely
unrelated to the problem . . . . The funds of these corporations are, for all practical
purposes, Government funds; the losses, if losses there be, are the Government's losses.
Id at 523-24. See Note, supra note 39, at 304.
89. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279-80
(1977); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1975); King v. Caesar
Rodney School Dist., 396 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Del. 1975).
90. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719-21 (1973); Hander v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 519 F.2d at 279; Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970); Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 393 F.
Supp. 1149, 1153-54 (S.D. Tex. 1975), vacated, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978); Gordenstein v.
University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D. Del. 1974); Fleming v. Upper Dublin Pub. School
Dist., 141 F. Supp. 813, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ("While the application of the Eleventh Amendment
is a question of federal law, nevertheless, . . . whether a particular state agency is entitled to
immunity from federal jurisdiction. . . depend[s] upon the characteristics, capacities, powers and
immunities of such agency as they are deined by the law of the state"); cf. Harris v. Tooele County
School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1973) (weight apparently given to state case law declar-
ing that "school districts are instrumentalities of the state acting in its behalf'; but decision actu-
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sion is created by the state for the sole purpose of delivering an essen-
tial governmental service, if the subdivision is incorporated and
capable of raising revenues it is likely to be treated as a separate entity
from the state, subject to suit in federal court.91
The courts' emphasis on mechanical structure rather than the
state's actual intent indicates that the consideration of state law by fed-
eral courts is, in reality, merely a mechanism for applying federal law.
As such, the test is incapable of ameliorating the federalism problems
inherent in the differentiation between state and subdivision. Further-
more, this structural emphasis creates the state's chief dilemma. In or-
der for the state to carry on its complex variety of governmental duties,
it must delegate to manageable units. To delegate effectively, the state
must endow the units it creates with the powers necessary successfully
to execute the duties delegated to them. But if the subdivisions have
these powers, they will be treated as "separate entities," and thus
outside the blanket of eleventh amendment state immunity from suit.
The state's choice, then, is to choose not to delegate, which may lead to
problems of inefficient, unwieldly management, or to delegate and give
up its immunity from suit in federal court.
B. Facilitation of the Overall Purpose of the Eleventh Amendment.
Since cases dealing with immunity under the eleventh amendment
fail to reveal any justification for distinguishing between states and
their political subdivisions, one may turn next to the purposes of the
eleventh amendment as a whole. If the purposes of the eleventh
amendment are promoted by holding "the state" immune while exclud-
ing its subdivisions, the difference in treatment may be justified.
1. Fear of War Debt Enforcement and Federal Encroachment on
State Treasuries. One of the reasons most frequently given to explain
the passage of the eleventh amendment was the fear that the states
would be forced, by means of suits in federal court, to pay their very
considerable war debts.92 Many feared that the states would face ruin
ally based on the fact that a judgment against the school board would "ultimately reduce state
funds"). See notes 55-74 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-02
(1979); Universal Sur. Co. v. Lescher & Mahoney, 340 F. Supp. 303, 304-05 (D. Ariz. 1972).
92. See, e.g., Baker 139; Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the
White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REv. 1, 7, 9, 17 (1967); Jaffe, Suits Against Govern-
ments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1963); Mathis, supra note 48,
at 212; Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes ofAction Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1434
(1975); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of
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if forced to pay the full face value of these debts.93
If protection from payment of war debts was the sole purpose be-
hind passage of the eleventh amendment, there may be an explanation
for differentiating between the states and their political subdivisions:
there may have been no danger of suits to enforce war debts against
cities and counties, and therefore no need to protect them. For that
matter, even if subdivisions had incurred debts similar to the states,
Revolutionary War debts were no longer a concern for states or sub-
divisions one hundred years after passage of the eleventh amendment,
when Lincoln County was decided. Excluding subdivisions from pro-
tection might, accordingly, have been viewed as a means for narrowing
the impact of an amendment no longer needed. If the amendment had
indeed served its purpose, however, it should have been removed from
the Constitution altogether rather than narrowed in such a way as to
raise new problems under the still viable tenth amendment.
Confining the purpose of the eleventh amendment solely to protec-
tion of war debts gives the amendment an excessively narrow interpre-
tation. It seems likely that if war debt protection were the
amendment's sole purpose, it would have been worded accordingly. In
fact, courts have tended to generalize the purpose of the eleventh
amendment to one of protecting state fiscal autonomy against any type
of private suit for damages commenced in federal court.94 But this pur-
pose also fails to provide a meaningful justification for differentiating
between states and their subdivisions, since the governmental property
Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682, 683 (1976). But see C.
JACOBs 68-70. Jacobs argues forcefully that federal judicial enforcement of war debt obligations
was not a major concern in the passage of the eleventh amendment. According to Jacobs, war
debts were not unmanageable at the time the eleventh amendment was passed. The Federalists,
who controlled Congress at the time, believed that satisfaction of public debts was a sacred obliga-
tion. Had they seriously believed that the states would be financially irresponsible, they would
never have voted for the amendment.
93. According to Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-
07 (1821):
It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the states were
greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the fed-
eral courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and
the court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehen-
sions that were so extensively entertained, . . . [the eleventh] amendment was proposed
in congress and adopted by the state legislatures. . . . Those who were inhibited from
commencing a suit against a state, or from prosecuting one which might be commenced
before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might probably be its credi-
tors. There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister states would be creditors to
any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the court in
those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace.
Id at 406-07.
94. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277-78
(5th Cir. 1975); Note, supra note 78, at 1486.
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of the subdivision is the property of the state, and recovery from the
subdivision's treasury does affect the state's fiscal autonomy.95
2. Sovereign Immunity and Federalism. Another frequently cited
reason for passage of the eleventh amendment was the desire to insure
that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity would survive in the
United States. 96 The Supreme Court itself has taken this position on
several occasions, as in In re Ayers,97 where the Court stated:
The very object and purpose of the 11 th Amendment were to prevent
the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was thought to be
neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union,
invested with that large residium of sovereignty which had not been
delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to
answer the complaints of private persons . . . or that the course of
their public policy and the administration of their public affairs
should be subject to and controlled by the mandates ofjudicial tribu-
nals without their consent, and in favor of individual interests.98
Scholarly commentators have argued that the eleventh amend-
ment was meant to reverse Chisholm v. Georgia99 and reinstate the
framers' original understanding that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
95. See notes 75-88 supra and accompanying text.
96. This position, like others taken regarding the purpose of the eleventh amendment, has
been greatly disputed. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), Chief Justice Mar-
shall insisted
that [the Congress'] motive [in passing the eleventh amendment] was not to maintain the
sovereignty of a state from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance
before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It
does not comprehend controversies betweeen two or more states, or between a state and
a foreign state. . . . We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than
the dignity of a state.
Id at 406. See C. JACOBS, passim; Engdahl, Immunity andAccountabilityfor Positive Governmen-
tal Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 9-11, 75 (1972); McCormack, IntergovernmentalImmunity and
the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485, 514-15 (1973); cf. Baker 160 (discussing problems
with an analogy between eleventh amendment cases and the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
97. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
98. Id at 505.
99. See the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall in Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health
Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1973):
Following the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), in which this Court
held that federal jurisdiction encompassed a suit brought against a nonconsenting State
by citizens of another State, the Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the in-
tent of the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power .... It had been
widely understood prior to ratification of the Constitution that the provision in Art. III,
§ 2, concerning "Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State"
would not provide a mechanism for making States unwilling defendants in federal
court. . . . The Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular hold-
ing in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding ....
Id at 291-92. See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934); M. IRISH & J. PROTHRO,
THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128 (4th ed. 1968); L. TIusE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 130 (1978); Baker 144-45; Cullison, supra note 92, at 9; Nowak, supra note 92, at
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nity would qualify article III of the Constitution.' It has also been
suggested that the amendment was meant to enact the dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Iredell in Chisholm.' Some scholars have theorized that
the eleventh amendment incorporated the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity into the Constitution, while others believe that it merely insured
the continued existence of the doctrine in common law, free from inter-
ference of the courts but subject to modification by Congress.' 2 Re-
gardless of the exact approach to sovereign immunity taken by the
eleventh amendment, it is questionable whether the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, in any form, provides serious justification for the differ-
entiation of the states from their political subdivisions.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was brought to the United
States from England, but it does not appear that the United States' sub-
sequent differentiation of states and their subdivisions for purposes of
granting sovereign immunity was based on any parallel practice in En-
gland. Suits against counties and cities of Britain were not generally
maintained at the time of and prior to passage of the eleventh amend-
ment. 10 3 The extent and source of the powers and duties of these Brit-
ish subdivisions differed from those of their American counterparts,
however, making the meaning of this fact difficult to assess. 04 Corpo-
rate franchises granted to the British subdivisions were more nearly
like those of private corporations, making them less subject to legisla-
tive control than American subdivisions. 0 5 Attempting to draw a com-
parison between American and British subdivisions does not seem
1424-25; Tribe, supra note 92, at 684. Contra, C. JACOBS passim; Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immuniy Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 531 (1978).
100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity. . .between a State and Citizens of another State ....
101. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890):
[O]n this question of the suability of the States by individuals, the highest authority of
this country [that is, the amendment process] was in accord rather with the minority than
with the majority of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and this
fact lends additional interest to the able opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell on that occasion.
Id at 12. See also Baker 143-44; Walkup, Immunity of the Statefrom Suit by Its Citizens-Toward
a More Enlightened Concept, 36 GEo. L. REV. 310, 322-23 (1948).
102. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Field, supra note 99; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immuniy Doctrines." Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203
(1978); Nowak, supra note 92; Tribe, supra note 92.
103. See, e.g., Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
104. It is difficult to look to the British form of sovereign immunity for answers to questions
about our own, as the doctrine, when brought to the United States, was applied to a government
whose philosophy and structure differed greatly from the one the doctrine was originally devel-
oped to serve. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); C. JACOBS 150-55; Baker 154; McCormack, supra note 96, at 504.
105. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 531 (1879).
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fruitful in any case, since it is not clear that the rule of county or city
immunity in Britain was related to the British doctrine of sovereign
immunity.1 16 Accordingly, British precedent does not offer a convinc-
ing explanation for the holding in Lincoln County.
In the United States, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it de-
veloped in state law, generally treated political subdivisions as a part of
the state and entitled them to the state's immunity, at least insofar as
they were acting in a governmental capacity.0 7 If they were to be held
liable, it was because the state expressly permitted it.'" There has been
no explanation why the federal law of sovereign immunity, as purport-
edly applied through the eleventh amendment, should differ from the
state law if both the state and federal sovereign immunity laws are to
serve the same general purpose. 0 9
It is, however, by no means certain that sovereign immunity under
the eleventh amendment is meant to serve the same purpose as it serves
under state law. In the eleventh amendment context, sovereign immu-
nity is an expression of the principles of federalism."10 As one scholar
has termed it, while the purpose of common law sovereign immunity is
to prevent courts and plaintiffs generally from interfering with the
workings of government, sovereign immunity under the eleventh
amendment was designed specifically to prohibit the federal govern-
ment, through its courts, from interfering with the internal workings of
state government."' Indeed, Professor Jacobs has gone further to as-
sert that
[n]either the text of the Eleventh Amendment nor the events ac-
counting for its adoption indicate that its principal purpose was to
affirm or sanction the immunity of the sovereign; The amendment
can be better understood as the constitutional outcome of the first in
a protracted series of confrontations between the states, on the one
106. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,215,359 P.2d 457, 459, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
91(1961).
107. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 29.5-.7 (1956); Baker 162.
108. The importance of sovereign immunity has declined in recent years due to its increasing
unpopularity in judicial and scholarly circles. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 99 S. Ct. 1182 (1979);
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 107, § 3.18, at 277-79 (Supp. 1968); Baker 162; Cullison, supra
note 92, at 6; Davis, Sovereign lmmunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383 (1970). However, present
unpopularity and the desire to restrain the doctrine does not provide a historical explanation for
its limitation to the state proper under the eleventh amendment in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
109. As Chief Justice Jay noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, if sovereign immunity could be
claimed by a government in which the people govern, there was little reason to give it to the fifty
thousand residents of Delaware and deny it to the forty thousand residents of Philadelphia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793).
110. See Baker passim; Note, supra note 78, at 1483.
111. Note, supra note 78, at 1480-81.
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hand, and the federal judiciary, on the other, over the nature of the
Federal Union and the position of the states in the constitutional or-
der." t 2
Another scholar suggests that immunity from suit in federal court
under the eleventh amendment is a constitutional right guaranteed to
states against individual plaintiffs much like immunity from self-in-
crimination is guaranteed to individuals against the state and federal
governments." t3
The common element in each of these explanations of sovereign
immunity under the eleventh amendment is the implication that the
purpose of the eleventh amendment, either at passage or through sub-
sequent construction by the courts, was to balance the relative powers
of the federal and state governments and to prohibit federal interfer-
ence with the states' discretion to define and structure their own inter-
nal functions. If the purpose of the eleventh amendment is to serve the
principles of federalism, the exclusion of state political subdivisions
from its protection not only fails to further that goal but in fact frus-
trates it. 114 The state's right freely to delegate its powers and responsi-
bilities in the way it deems most efficient is hampered by the fact that if
it chooses to delegate power it must forego the immunity it would
otherwise enjoy."t t Further, judgments for damages against the trea-
suries of political subdivisions restrict the states' own ability to provide
governmental services. 6
112. C. JACOBS 161-62. Professor Warren states that a major factor inducing passage of the
eleventh amendment was the fear of losing the independence of state governments in the "increas-
ing growth and consolidation of the powers of the Federal Government in all its branches." I C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 92 (1922).
113. Baker 163-65. This interpretation is supported by language in Supreme Court opinions.
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court, in deciding whether the state had construc-
tively waived its eleventh amendment immunity, held: "Constructive consent is not a doctrine
commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here.
In deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language. Id at 673. See
also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976).
114. Professor Baker has specifically addressed the issue of the differentiation of states from
their political subdivisions under the federalism theory of the eleventh amendment. He concludes
that although subdivisions perform state governmental functions, "the courts have recognized that
these units are often so removed from state government that subjecting them to suit in federal
court has few federalism repercussions." Baker 176. He observes that this is not always the case,
however, and acknowledges that the policy stressed in Usery raises questions about whether state
sovereignty is unhampered by denying political subdivisions the shield of immunity. Id 175-77.
115. See note 39 supra and text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
116. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
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III. THE STATE-SUBDIVISION DISTINCTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
RECENT ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE
Eleventh amendment cases do not offer compelling reasons for
providing federal court immunity to states while denying this immunity
to their political subdivisions. Further, this differentiation is not neces-
sary to accomplish the purposes for which the eleventh amendment was
passed. In fact, differentiation of states and their subdivisions under-
cuts at least two of the chief purposes given for the amendment's pas-
sage and continued enforcement" 7 and impinges on the governmental
discretion of the states in a manner inconsistent with sound principles
of federalism." 8 It seems appropriate, therefore, to consider aban-
doning the policy of differentiation in order to create a coherent elev-
enth amendment policy that is consistent with the rest of the
Constitution.
This suggestion of change may seem disconcerting given the fact
that the state-subdivision distinction has been observed for over a cen-
tury, and that it has served as a basic premise underlying important
decisions. Indeed, the ramifications of change at this point might seem
even more harmful than the encroachment on federalism that the rule
presently permits. On closer examination of recent eleventh amend-
ment developments, however, it appears that the time may be right for
the change.
For the first time in many years legal scholars and the courts are
subjecting the eleventh amendment and the related doctrine of sover-
eign immunity to close scrutiny. The Supreme Court has undertaken
some major adjustments in the area that have enhanced the clarity and
coherence of the law and have evinced a new attitude toward the
breadth of eleventh amendment protection. The trend developing from
these decisions could readily accommodate a revision in the eleventh
amendment treatment of political subdivisions.
A. Recent Cases Recognizing Congressional Power to Override the
States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer' '9 is the strongest evidence of this new trend in
reevaluating the breadth of the eleventh amendment. In Fitzpatrick the
Supreme Court held that Congress, pursuant to its power to enforce the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment, could set aside state eleventh
117. See note 114 supra and text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
118. See notes 26-27, 31 & 34 supra and text accompanying notes 26-34 supra.
119. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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amendment immunity and subject states to suit for money damages in
federal court. According to the Court,
the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section
Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate
legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state au-
thority. . . . We think that Congress may, in determining what is
"appropriate legislation" for purposes of enforcing provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other con-
texts.' 20
Fitzpatrick diminishes the eleventh amendment protection of the
states. The trend, however, may not end with the holding in that case.
If Congress may abrogate state immunity from suit in order to enforce
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, it is conceivable that it
will be found to have similar power to enforce other constitutional pro-
visions. 2' The majority in Fitzpatrick strongly implied that the com-
merce clause conveys such power.' 22 Following the Fitzpatrick lead,
the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have since held that
Congress' war powers prevail over the states' eleventh amendment im-
munity.'23 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has found that the eleventh
amendment is subordinate to the copyright and patent clause. 24 If the
Supreme Court affirms such decisions, the eleventh amendment immu-
nity from suit may be diminished to the point that Congress can re-
move it merely by expressing its intent to do so when it passes new
120. Id at 456. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (federal courts may require
states to pay attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)).
121. For a particularly interesting discussion of this proposition, see Field, supra note 102.
122. 427 U.S. at 452. In the Fitzpatrick decision the Court relied in part upon Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In that case it had found the State of Alabama subject to suit
in federal court under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
The Court observed that Congress had considerable power under the commerce clause to regulate
common carriers, that Congress clearly intended to subject states to suit under the FELA, and that
Alabama, knowing of Congress' power and intent, had continued to operate a common carrier.
On these grounds, the Court concluded that Alabama had given "constructive consent" to be sued.
The Fitzpatrick Court did not attempt to find constructive consent. For detailed discussions of the
cases foreshadowing the Fitzpatrick decision, see Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1075-77 (5th Cir. 1979); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 939-41 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 2417 (1979).
123. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Jennings v. Illinois Office
of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2417 (1979). See also Camacho v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 450 F. Supp. 231, 234 (D.P.R. 1978); Schaller v. Board of Educ., 449 F. Supp. 30,
32-33 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
124. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Lemelson v. Ampex
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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legislation. 125
B. Legal Scholars' View of Congressional Power to Override Eleventh
Amendment Immunity.
Constitutional scholars have also recently focused their attention
on the eleventh amendment, reaching important conclusions regarding
the breadth of the immunity it grants to states. After considering the
baffling and seemingly contradictory array of eleventh amendment
cases, Lawrence Tribe concludes that
[tihe only satisfying reconciliation of the cases with a conception of
the eleventh amendment as either conferring a category of rights
upon the states or at least confirming the states' retention of rights
against unconsented suit, is to distinguish rights conferred against the
federal judiciary from rights conferred against Congress. 126
According to Professor Tribe, nothing in the amendment's language or
history suggests that it was meant to limit the power of Congress to act
under its article I powers and the necessary and proper clause or the
enforcement clauses of the amendments. The eleventh amendment
merely limited the judiciary's power to subject the states to suit in fed-
eral court.127 Accordingly, Congress should be able to compel states to
submit to federal court jurisdiction whenever it finds this necessary in
the pursuit of its proper tasks. 128
Similarly, John Nowak argues that while the courts have been cor-
rect in reading the eleventh amendment as a direct limitation on their
own powers, the eleventh amendment poses no limitation on the power
of Congress to subject states to suit,' 29 except that it prohibits the crea-
tion of retroactive causes of action.' 3° This prohibition, according to
Professor Nowak, is "so basic to the eleventh amendment that it should
125. See Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1147 (1979); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600
F.2d at 1077.
126. Tribe, supra note 92, at 693.
127. Id 693-94.
128. Id 694. Professor Tribe points out, however, that congressional power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity is not limitless. Congress cannot confer jurisdiction on article III courts be-
yond the boundaries drawn in that article. Further, Congress must be acting under an otherwise
valid federal lawmaking power. Finally, in light of the tenth amendment, Congress may not sub-
ject states to suit if to do so would impair state integrity or state "ability to function effectively in a
federal system." Id 696-97 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
According to Tribe, the surrender of state sovereignty in areas that the Constitution expressly
submits to national control is part of the constitutional plan. Tribe, supra note 92, at 694-96.
Congress is the proper body to decide when the states should be made to answer to private parties
as defendants in federal courts because it is composed of representatives of the states and is there-
fore more "attentive to the concerns of state governments as separate sovereigns" than are the
courts. Id 695.
129. Nowak, supra note 92, at 1442.
130. Id 1444. To impose retroactive causes of action, Nowak asserts, would "seriously upset"
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be construed as applying to Congressional enactments, even though the
amendment is framed only in terms of the judicial power."' t3 1
Martha Field goes a step beyond Tribe and Nowak by suggesting
that sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that is not constitu-
tionally compelled.' 3 2  According to Professor Field, the eleventh
amendment was intended only to overturn the Chisholm case, in which
the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution as abrogating sover-
eign immunity.133 The amendment restored the original constitutional
neutrality on the subject, thus allowing state sovereign immunity to
continue to exist in its common law form. 134 Because sovereign immu-
nity exists only in common law, Field concludes that Congress has the
power to pass laws subjecting the states to all types of private suits in
federal court. The only checks on this power are the tenth amendment
and the requirement that Congress stay within its delineated powers. 35
In instances in which Congress is silent, however, the eleventh amend-
ment prevents courts from implying a right to sue states in federal
court. 1
36
C. The Diminished Constitutional Status of Sovereign Immunity.
Professor Field's theory not only lends support to the growing
trend that recognizes congressional power as a major limitation on the
eleventh amendment, it also greatly reduces the constitutional status of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 37 The Supreme Court recently
decided a case that diminished the importance of the doctrine on an-
other front, lending implicit support to Field's theory.
Nevada v. Hall38 involved the question of whether a state may
claim immunity from suit in the courts of another state. Nevada, the
named defendant in a personal injury suit filed in the California
courts, 39 claimed that the Constitution implicitly protected it from
state fiscal policy. A state would be forced to find funds to pay for liabilities it incurred in prior
fiscal years when it was unaware of its liability or the need to allocate funds to pay damages.
131. Id Professor Nowak agrees with Professor Tribe that the courts are not the proper agents
to handle the delicate federalism issues involved in the question of federal court jurisdiction over
the states. Congress is the only governmental entity that has a dual responsibility to the state and
federal systems and is accountable at both levels. Id 1441.
132. Field, supra note 99; Field, supra note 102.
133. See note 44 supra and text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
134. Field, supra note 99, at 538-40.
135. Field, supra note 102, at 1227.
136. Id 1279.
137. See note 108 supra.
138. 99 S. Ct. 1182 (1979).
139. The suit arose from an automobile accident in California between plaintiffs, California
residents, and a Nevada employee driving a state car on official business.
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having to answer. Nevada argued that at the time the Constitution was
ratified there was a common understanding that no sovereign was ame-
nable to suit in any court without its consent, an understanding repeat-
edly reflected in Supreme Court opinions.1 40
The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution implicitly
denies one state jurisdiction over another. "In the past, this Court has
presumed that the States intended to adopt policies of broad comity
towards one another. But this presumption reflected an understanding
of state policy, rather than a constitutional command."' 141 State immu-
nity from suits in the courts of other states, the majority held, is only "a
matter of comity" that the states may reject if they choose. 142 For the
federal courts to hold "by inference from the structure of our Constitu-
tion and nothing else"' 43 that California was not free to enforce its own
legal policies against another sovereign would constitute a severe intru-
sion on California's sovereignty contrary to the dictates of the tenth
amendment. 44
The Hall decision does not directly relate to the question of sover-
eign immunity under the eleventh amendment. Nevertheless, the
Court's rejection of Nevada's argument that the doctrine is implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution may indicate that the Court would also
accept Professor Field's contention that the eleventh amendment does
140. 99 S. Ct. at 1185. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent for a detailed analysis of these cases.
Id at 1194-99.
Nevada also argued that even if the California courts did have jurisdiction, the full faith and
credit clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1, required California to observe a Nevada statute limiting
the damages that could be awarded against the state. The Court rejected this contention. "Full
faith and credit. . does not here enable one state to legislate for the other or to project its laws
across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequence of
acts within it." 99 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 504-05 (1939)).
141. 99 S. Ct. at 1191.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id The Court noted that California's exercise ofjurisdiction posed "no substantial threat
to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism." A simple personal injury case could
"hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.' Id at 1190
n.24. The case offered no occasion to consider whether other state actions "might require a differ-
ent analysis or a different result." Id
Dismissing this reservation, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, termed the majority's holding as
a "basic and undeniable ruling. . . that what we have always thought of as a sovereign State is
now to be treated in the courts of a sister state. . . just as any other litigant." Id at 1192 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also wrote a strong dissent: "mhe Court's decision today works a funda-
mental readjustment of interstate relationships which is impossible to reconcile not only with an
'assumption' this and other courts have entertained for almost 200 years, but also with express
holdings of this Court and the logic of the constitutional plan itself." Id at 1194 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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not make sovereign immunity constitutionally required. In any event,
the case indicates that the Supreme Court may be reconsidering the
importance of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As the Court be-
comes less sympathetic to state immunity to suit, it may become even
more sympathetic to the claim that Congress may subject states to suit
in federal court.
D. Implications of the Eleventh Amendment Transition for the
Differentiation of States and Their Subdivisions.
It is clear that eleventh amendment doctrine is undergoing rapid
and far-reaching change. The scope of eleventh amendment immunity
has been and may continue to be diminished through congressional ac-
tion, while the decline of the constitutional status of sovereign immu-
nity may ultimately shrink eleventh amendment protection still further.
The implications of these innovations in eleventh amendment ju-
risprudence are important to a proposal to dispense with the differenti-
ation of states and their political subdivisions. Since the law is the
throes of change, a further realignment could be accommodated with
greater ease than it might were the law well settled. Further, as the
number of instances in which the eleventh amendment will shelter
states from suit in federal courts decreases, the impact of allowing po-
litical subdivisons to share in that reduced immunity lessens.
Of course, one might observe that if the states themselves are sub-
jected to suit in federal court more often, the undesirable effects of dis-
tinguishing states from subdivisions will be diminished. For example,
if states find themselves subject to frequent suits in federal court due to
a narrowing of eleventh amendment protection, the fact that a delega-
tion of power waives their narrow immunity may carry so little weight
as never to deter states from freely delegating duties to subdivisions.
Accordingly, the intrusion on the principles of federalism will not be as
great as it is now. However slight the impact that differentiation ulti-
mately has on federalism, though, there is still cause to discontinue the
practice. First, since there is no utility in the differentiation to counter-
balance the harm to federalism, there is no reason to tolerate the en-
croachment, however small. Further, abandoning the deviant
definition of "state" under the eleventh amendment and adopting the
definition as it is used in other parts of the Constitution will bring
greater consistency and coherence to the interpretation of the document
as a whole. Finally, by treating states and their subdivisions in the
same way, federal courts would be freed from the difficult and fruitless
task of distinguishing between those subdivisions that are "arms of the
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state" and those that are not. 45
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have treated political subdivisions of the states as in-
dependent entities for eleventh amendment purposes despite the fact
that this practice furthers no eleventh amendment goals and is contrary
to sound principles of federalism. Current trends in eleventh amend-
ment and sovereign immunity jurisprudence offer a unique opportunity
for the courts to discontinue this practice and to grant political subdivi-
sions immunity from suit in federal court that is equal in scope to the
immunity enjoyed by their parent states. This reassessment would
yield consistent treatment of states and subdivisions in all constitu-
tional matters, add coherence to the Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution as a whole, and eliminate an unjustified restriction on the
discretion of the states.
Margreth Barrett
145. See text accompanying notes 50-91 supra.
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